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Abstract 
The possibility that extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs) could be hostile to humanity 
has been raised as a reason to avoid even trying to contact ETIs. However, there is a 
distinct shortage of analytical discussion about the risks of an attack, perhaps because 
of an implicit premise that we cannot analyze the decision making of an alien 
civilization. This paper argues that we can draw some inferences from the history of 
the Cold War and nuclear deterrence in order to show that at least some attack 
scenarios are likely to be exaggerated. In particular, it would seem to be unlikely that 
the humanity would be attacked simply because it might, some time in the future, 
present a threat to the ETI. Even if communication proves to be difficult, rational 
decision-makers should avoid unprovoked attacks, because their success would be 
very difficult to assure. In general, it seems believable that interstellar conflicts 
between civilizations would remain rare. The findings advise caution for proposed 
interstellar missions, however, as starfaring capability itself might be seen as a threat. 
On the other hand, attempting to contact ETIs seems to be a relatively low-risk 
strategy: paranoid ETIs must also consider the possibility that the messages are a 
deception designed to lure out hostile civilizations and preemptively destroy them. 
Keywords: SETI, METI, Extraterrestrial life, Interstellar probes, Contact, Scenario 
analysis, Deterrence 
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1. Introduction 
A central fixture in much of the critique expressed against search for and messaging 
to extraterrestrial intelligences (SETI and METI) has been whether actual contact 
would be harmful to humanity. In particular, concern has been raised about the 
possibility of humanity broadcasting its location to hostile extraterrestrial 
intelligences (ETIs) that might see the Earth as a desirable conquest or humans as a 
threat to their long-term safety.  
Various authors, including both scientists and science fiction writers, have suggested 
that hostility or fear of hostilities could be a possible or even likely solution to the 
Fermi Paradox, i.e. lack of contact with ETIs [1–4].  According to these views, the 
reason why we haven’t been able to observe ETIs is either because civilizations are 
ultimately hostile to each other and contacts between civilizations lead to the 
destruction of one or another, or because ETIs (in our neighborhood, at the least) 
believe this to be case and stay quiet for fear of detection. Of these, the former 
solution is the most unsettling: our lack of caution in broadcasting powerful 
electromagnetic signals and our efforts to contact ETIs could be inviting an attack. 
It should be stated here that I do not argue that such aggressiveness would be the 
default or even likely attitude for possible ETIs. Without hard evidence either way, it 
seems at least equally plausible that advanced civilizations (presumably with equally 
advanced means of destruction at their disposal) have developed ways of life and 
philosophies that greatly lessen the likelihood of violent conflicts among themselves 
and with others. Progress towards less violent and more risk-averse societies is 
evident among humans [5] and simulation experiments, among other things, suggest 
that cooperative, “pacifistic” civilizations tend to outcompete aggressive ones in the 
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long run [6,7]. Furthermore, the realities of interstellar travel may very well eliminate 
interstellar aggression as a policy option [8,9]. Obviously, if all the ETIs possibly 
encountered by humans are benevolent, neutral, or unable to harm us, the question 
whether we would be attacked would be rendered moot.  
On the other hand, many rationales for hostility have also been suggested. The non-
exhaustive list includes an eagerness to consume our resources, an ideological 
requirement, a desire to be the sole galactic power, indifference to our existence, or a 
combination of the above [10]. Science fiction authors in particular have argued that 
ETIs could see other species as threats to their own well-being, and that paranoid or 
xenophobic ETIs might simply want to preventively destroy other species before they 
can pose an intentional or unintentional threat to them [4]. Perhaps the most chilling 
part of this rationale is that it does not require any particular malice from the part of 
the ETIs: a simple “rational” if possibly paranoid analysis might suffice to seal our 
execution warrant. After all, if interstellar travel proves to be feasible, there is always 
the non-zero probability of humanity harming ETIs.  
Prior research has analyzed the general logic and some specific scenarios of 
interstellar conflict and the risks of contacting possible ETIs (e.g. [7–12]), usually 
concluding that the practical problems of attacks, invasions and resource grabs would 
make the possibility of realistic gains dubious at best. However, to my knowledge, no 
prior work has analyzed the specific case of preventive first strike aimed at 
eliminating competitors. Although acknowledging the limitations of generalizing 
from human experience, I believe that the lessons learned from the Cold War – where 
two fundamentally antagonistic civilizations were able to destroy one another and 
even had a rationale for launching a disarming first strike – can be fruitfully extended 
to the specifics of interstellar conflict. In short, this paper tries to roughly estimate the 
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risks of what is perhaps the most disquieting scenario: that an ETI would, upon 
detecting advanced civilization on Earth, launches an unprovoked preventive attack 
aimed at destroying or severely damaging the humanity.  
While this analysis does not cover irrational attacks (e.g. ones motivated by ideology, 
such as xenophobia), carelessness or accidents, the findings do suggest that the 
possibility of retaliation would seem to make preventive attacks a flawed strategy, and 
that interstellar civilizations would be disinclined to knowingly initiate hostilities 
against each other in general – even under the worst case assumption that 
communicating peaceful intentions and working towards win-win solutions across 
interstellar distances proves to be impossible. In fact, even irrationally aggressive 
civilizations can probably be deterred. The paper should help to shape the discussion 
of risks of ETI contact and the findings should help ameliorate one of the objections 
expressed against METI efforts, namely, that METI would broadcast our location to a 
possibly hostile ETI (for an overview of the discussion, see e.g. [12,13]). However, 
the study also advises caution in the design of interstellar exploratory missions. 
This paper is organized as follows: I will first briefly revisit the general arguments for 
and against of what I call “paranoid” attitude towards other civilizations and note the 
similarities to relevant Cold War arguments. I then discuss the general problems 
facing a would-be attacker, and the requirements of deterrence. Then, I create a 
simplified model of interstellar attack and retaliation in order to illustrate the 
difficulties facing the attacker. Finally, conclusions and a discussion are provided.  
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2. Why ETIs would want to kill us? 
In the past, several commentators have noted that we cannot rely on possible ETIs 
being benevolent towards us. Looking at examples of human and animal behavior 
towards other species and technologically less advanced cultures (e.g. [14]) and 
considering that any ETIs would be very likely to be much more advanced than 
humanity, there is a chance that humanity could be attacked if detected. The proposed 
motives for attack range from indifference and completely alien (i.e. 
incomprehensible) reasons to us being seen as a threat, an useful source of food or 
other resources, or simply as sources of good entertainment [14–16]. 
Although these concerns cannot be disproved, at least several of these rationales seem 
a priori rather far-fetched reasons for any advanced civilization to pose an existential 
threat to us. For example, a civilization capable of large-scale interstellar voyages 
must of necessity possess knowledge and energy reserves sufficient to satisfy most of 
its material needs via permanently recycling closed-loop economy within its 
spaceships [17]. If such technologies can be developed for use onboard spaceships, 
utilizing them within the species’ home system should be much more energy efficient 
and safer than raiding inhabited systems for resources [18].  
The exception to this rule, an exponentially expansive civilization could, in theory, 
populate the entire galaxy in very short timescale while “strip-mining” star systems in 
the process. However, since we haven’t seen any evidence of civilizations that strip-
mine everything on their path, the existence of such civilizations in our galaxy at the 
least seems doubtful [10,18]. It would therefore appear believable that, at least for the 
foreseeable future (thousands of years at the least), “true” interstellar civilizations 
would have ample space and would not have to risk antagonizing upcoming species. 
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Even if they colonize inhabited star systems, the inner planets and their resources may 
not even be very attractive when compared to resources available in e.g. asteroid belts 
and gas giants.  
One would indeed be hard pressed to understand why any star faring ETI would even 
bother threatening less advanced civilizations for what can be obtained through less 
risky and more profitable methods, e.g. cooperation and trade. The economic 
principle of comparative advantage should hold even between civilizations with 
immense differences in development, and therefore relations between two species 
would not be a simple zero-sum game of winners and losers. 
Therefore, arguments that any civilization that has truly mastered interstellar travel 
would have much to gain by destroying non-spacefaring species seem implausible. 
Destroying a species that cannot harm the invader would not improve the invader’s 
security at all, and the gain of a single planet would seem to be a trivial advantage to a 
civilization that already has the capability to live in space. Against this small or even 
negative gain, the extermination attempt risks leaving survivors or witnesses that in 
all likelihood would become security threats in the future. 
2.1. Small is dangerous: the threat of single-system 
civilizations and interstellar exploration 
However, the situation is somewhat different if the civilization is less advanced than a 
“true” star faring civilization. Perhaps the most threatening civilization will be the one 
that is unable or unwilling to colonize other star systems or even its own home 
system, but still has the capability to explore and industrialize inter-system space. 
Although such a “single-system” civilization would not threaten other civilizations for 
living space or resources, it (or, more to the point, its leaders) might feel threatened by 
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the very existence of other civilizations. The reason is fundamentally simple: a 
civilization living on one or at most a few worlds is inherently vulnerable. The 
vulnerability is compounded by lack of information about the other civilizations and 
their intents. If single-system civilization detects another civilization, immense 
distances and the associated light speed lag will most likely separate them. Moreover, 
alien cognitive processes are by definition likely to be very difficult to understand. 
This means that the single-system civilization cannot be at all certain whether or not 
the other might be planning an attack for some reason.  
Even if the other has no hostile intentions, star faring capability in itself can be seen 
as a threat. Just ordinary interaction between two species could inadvertently destroy 
or seriously damage one of them, perhaps through transmission of diseases, invasive 
species, or undesirable information [10]. Furthermore, any spacecraft capable of 
interstellar voyages in reasonable time is by itself a weapon of mass destruction. Even 
if  “breakthrough physics” concepts such as wormholes and warp drives [19] (all of 
which could be misused) prove to be impossible, relatively simple interstellar probes 
– possibly within humanity’s capabilities in the relatively near future [20–24] – could 
be devastating weapons. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows the kinetic energy for each 
1000 kg of spacecraft mass at different velocities. For comparison, the largest nuclear 
weapon exploded on Earth yielded ≈ 0.05-0.06 gigatons and the entire global nuclear 
stockpile has been estimated at 6.5 Gt. 
Table 1. Kinetic energy of 1000 kg impactor at various velocities, in gigatons of TNT 
equivalent (1 Gt = 4.184 x 1018 J) 
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It is easy to see that even primitive interstellar probes, traveling at an appreciable 
fraction of light speed, could be extremely dangerous to planet-bound civilizations. 
Besides intentionally hostile acts, simple accidents or acts of lunacy or recklessness 
could have extremely grave consequences for other species as well. At current and 
near-future levels of technology, detecting and intercepting such projectiles in time 
would be extremely difficult. Compared to objects of scientific interest such as 
asteroids, hostile probes could be relatively small and have very little apparent motion 
relative to their targets, effectively hiding them against the background. Although 
discussion of probe detection and planetary defense are beyond the scope of this 
paper, it seems to be that reliable detection and defense would require advanced 
technologies and significant off-planet infrastructure1.  
These considerations may be interpreted to suggest that all that is required for a 
civilization to pose a mortal threat to another is the capability to do harm. 
Presumably, because something bad can happen otherwise, any species (and in                                                                                                                 1  A  rough  calculation  made  by  the  author  suggests  that  the  passive  infrared  signature  from  a  primitive  Daedalus-­‐type  [24]  heading  towards  the  Earth  at  0.12  
c  might  in  theory  be  detectable  at  ≈  10-­‐20  AU  with  Hubble  Space  Telescope-­‐level  sensors  .  Detection  even  at  such  ranges  would  give  only  some  12  to  24  hours  of  warning  before  impact  (with  total  kinetic  energy  of  ≈  145  Gt).  If  the  probe  is  targeted  on  the  Earth  on  purpose,  as  opposed  to  e.g.  software  error  or  malfunction,  it  is  also  reasonable  to  expect  that  its  design  would  incorporate  some  low  observability  features.  These  could  probably  reduce  the  probe’s  signature  considerably.    
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particular, vulnerable single-system or single-planet species) should be predisposed to 
preventive elimination of potentially dangerous adversaries before they have the 
capability to do the same. Contrary to argument expressed by e.g. Musso [25], 
destroying another civilizations would not necessarily require “very evil species” 
inspired by “almost satanic will” (p.  51). 
It should be noted here that the definition of “single-system” could cover not just the 
species’ original home world, but also its colonies. If interstellar travel and 
communication remains difficult, individual colonies are likely to be very 
independent, and therefore are likely to make decisions about e.g. the risks and 
benefits of waging war with their neighbors independently from the broader 
considerations of the home world. Similarly, the arguments presented here will apply 
not just to a contact between two species, but also to relationships between two 
inhabited star systems, e.g. colonies and home worlds. 
2.2. Lessons from the Cold War 
Readers acquainted with the history of early Cold War and debates about nuclear 
strategy will find the above argumentation eerily familiar. Even serious early-war 
studies argued that since nuclear war would be almost certain to happen sooner or 
later, the U.S. should take the initiative and wage preventive war, on its own terms, 
against the Soviet Union before it became an existential threat [26,27]. For example, 
in 1954 a Joint Chiefs of Staff advance study group briefed the president Eisenhower 
on a plan proposing that the U.S. should “deliberately precipitat[e] war with the 
USSR in the near future… before the USSR could achieve a large enough 
thermonuclear capability to be a real menace to [the] Continental U.S.” [27] (p. 101) 
Another contemporary study concluded that anyone calling for restraint and relying 
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on retaliation in the event of nuclear attack was a “pseudo-moralist who insists that 
[the U.S.] must accept this catastrophe.” [27] (p. 100) 
Mathematically, the logic was sound. If a war had non-zero probability, given enough 
time, it would certainly occur. Given the trend towards increasing destructiveness and 
numbers of nuclear weapons, war in the far future would be more destructive than a 
war in the near future. Therefore, a logical conclusion would be to choose the least 
bad from two “tragic but distinguishable post-war states,” to use Herman Kahn’s 
memorable description.  
2.3. Retaliation and deterrence 
Needless to say, the “pseudo-moralists” still won the debate. Besides moral issues that 
troubled even generals (see e.g. [26,27]) and obvious political difficulties, preventive 
war would not have been reliable by the forces available to the U.S. in the late 1940s. 
After the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949, any attempt would almost certainly 
have resulted to a retaliatory response. Despite any defenses, some warheads would 
inevitably have gotten through, and losing “even” a single city would have been an 
unmitigated disaster by any practical measure. As the Cold War progressed, the 
increasing numbers of nuclear weapons and nearly invulnerable second-strike systems 
(in particular, submarines), together with the realization that global effects of nuclear 
war (e.g. fallout and nuclear winter) could doom the humanity, practically ended 
speculations about intentional, preventive war [28].  
In other words, fear of retaliation – i.e. deterrence – has been a major (albeit far from 
the only) reason why no state has initiated a preventive nuclear attack against another 
[29]. Although defining what constitutes an effective deterrent is difficult if not 
impossible, a tacit understanding seems to exist that deterrent is reliable if it can 
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inflict “unacceptable” damage to the attacker. In one recent example [30], the 
capability to destroy any ten cities in retaliation after a surprise attack was seen as 
reliable and adequate nuclear deterrent between the U.S. and Russia. Our own 
experience would therefore suggest that advanced civilizations tend to be risk-averse 
and do not want to gamble with even small portions of their heartland, unless left with 
absolutely no other option.  
Of course, extrapolating the behavior of ETIs from human examples is risky. The 
concept of unacceptable damage may simply not apply. Presumably, the inhibitions 
against killing (if they exist at all) will not be as strong when the target is another 
species, as can be demonstrated by how humans treat even relatively intelligent, 
harmless species such as dolphins or chimpanzees. If the biospheres are separated by 
light years, the concerns about global effects are moot, and it is possible that the 
technological disparity between the attacker and the defender is so great that the 
defender cannot effectively retaliate. After all, the age difference may be vast: the 
median age of terrestrial planets in our galaxy, for example, is likely to be 1.8 billion 
years more than the Earth’s [31]. 
However, the features of interstellar conflict will also remove some of the major 
objections raised against Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a deterrent strategy 
between human civilizations on Earth. For example, in response to an attack aimed at 
destroying the entire species, the concept of disproportionate response does not seem 
to be relevant. Likewise, lack of psychological inhibitions and isolation from 
ecosystem damages will also remove some of the objections [32] and therefore 
strengthen deterrence by making retaliation more likely. The major drawback of 
MAD doctrine, the need to keep large nuclear forces on alert and the resultant risk of 
accidents or sabotage, is almost completely averted: as the flight times to targets are 
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in any case measured in decades or centuries rather than minutes, the time spent for 
preparing the retaliatory response is not so critical. The remaining question mark 
would therefore seem to be the technological disparity: can the attacker count on 
being able to prevent the retaliation?  
3. General problems of interstellar conflict 
In the following, I shall consider certain problems that will be applicable to any 
interstellar conflict between two civilizations, heretofore termed as Attacking 
Civilization (AC) and Victim Civilization (VC). The term “civilization” may refer to 
a single civilization or a group of civilizations either acting jointly or being affected at 
the same time. I will also consider the implications of other civilization(s) not directly 
involved in the initial conflict, the Nth Civilization (NC). Before considering the 
specific problems, the following six major and one minor assumptions about the 
nature of interstellar conflict are outlined: 
1.  All civilizations will have a concept of risks and benefits, i.e. they are somewhat 
rational actors and do not simply act randomly.  
2.  A civilization that does not need to fear retaliation has little need to destroy other 
civilizations. The star faring civilizations discussed above will have sufficient 
knowledge and resources on their disposal to have no real need to exterminate planet-
bound civilizations. Although accidents, carelessness and attacks stemming from e.g. 
xenophobia or completely alien motives cannot be ruled out, it would seem that 
deliberate attack aimed at the destruction of an irrelevant species would expend 
resources to little purpose. After all, as common sense and the Table 2 show, if the 
VC cannot be a threat to the AC, ever, destroying it does not change the security 
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situation of the AC. The AC not attacking would therefore seem to be the optimal 
strategy. Another reason to doubt the possibility of attack by most ancient 
civilizations (e.g. ≈ 109 years old) is the fact that such civilizations would have had 
ample time to explore throughout the galaxy. If such civilizations were to be hostile, 
they would have also had time to plant automated sentinels on most if not all star 
systems. Delaying the attack until the VC has developed a technological civilization 
would seem to be a deeply flawed strategy. 
If only a civilization that has a reason to fear the VC’s current or future capabilities 
should have a reason to try to destroy it, then the major question of deterrence in 
interstellar relationships – whether the technological disparity will always be too great 
for the VC to effectively threaten with retaliation – has a simple, negative answer.  
 
Table 2. Simplified outcomes from non-threatening and threatening Victim 
Civilizations. “Cooperation” refers to non-zero sum cooperation, such as trade.  
 
3. There are practical limits to technological development. Although debatable, for 
the purposes of this paper it seems reasonable to believe that civilizations will at some 
point reach a stage where they will not be able to greatly reduce the vulnerability of 
their habitats and other installations through technological improvements (see also 
[33]).  
   15  
Because of the third assumption, I can also assume that no defense can be guaranteed 
to be 100% successful 100% of the time. In other words, there is always a possibility 
that an attack will slip through even the most elaborate and advanced defenses.  
5. No attack can be guaranteed to be 100% successful. There is always a chance that 
any attack will fail to achieve its complete objectives. Particularly if the objective is 
the total destruction of the Victim Civilization, being completely certain about 
complete success remains difficult despite technological advancements. For example, 
self-contained space habitats in the outer reaches of the star system could conceivably 
escape initial attacks, or the VC might have even sent out colonization ships after the 
initial detection but before the attack.  
The outcome of the last three assumptions is clear. To avoid retaliation, the AC needs 
to be nearly 100% certain to destroy the VC’s ability to retaliate. However, effectively 
deterring the AC requires only that the VC have the capability to threaten 
unacceptable damage to the AC. The analogue to modern-day nuclear forces is direct: 
creating absolutely effective first strike weapons and gathering timely intelligence 
required for their use will always be massively more complicated than creating 
effective deterrent weapons. 
6. Verification of peaceful intentions may be difficult. The interstellar distances make 
any communications and assurances doubtful; there is little that can be done, short of 
a physical visit, to verify the truth of any statement any civilization may make. In the 
worst case, crafting “win-win” strategies and easing tensions may be impossible.  
Finally, this study assumes that the light speed limit holds. Although this assumption 
can be relaxed considerably without altering the conclusions unduly, the conclusions 
are even stronger if matter or information cannot be transmitted faster than light.  
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3.1. The problem of interstellar intelligence gathering 
The principal problem facing any would-be Attacking Civilization is knowing what to 
attack. Solid intelligence has been seen as the essential ingredient of any attack 
planning among humans, and it is difficult to see that that would be very different 
with any conceivable aliens. However, gathering that intelligence might be very 
difficult and any results fundamentally uncertain. 
Consider just the simplest problem, finding all the habitats that need to be targeted for 
destruction. Even at less than interstellar distances, accurately identifying such 
habitats may be difficult. Unless these can be destroyed, the AC must fear retaliation, 
as there is always a chance that the VC learns enough about the AC to deduce the 
origin of the attack and retaliate against AC’s home worlds – even if the AC manages 
to inflict mortal wounds on the VC. 
What’s more, if the light speed limit holds, all intelligence gathered before an attack is 
launched will be very much out of date by the time the attacking force arrives to the 
target system. This is not so much a problem if the attack is simply intended to inflict 
as much damage as possible, as would be the case with a retaliatory strike. However, 
it is a serious problem if the objective is the complete destruction of the Victim 
Civilization, so that it is unable to retaliate any time in the future. In the worst case, if 
the AC seriously misjudges the VC’s speed of development, the attacking force may 
be outclassed by centuries of technological development, its intentions correctly 
surmised (perhaps even if it can decide not to attack) and a retaliatory response 
mounted without any damage to the VC. Besides technological development, the time 
lag gives the VC more opportunities to establish contacts with other civilizations, 
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maybe simply by sending out colonization ships to other star systems. As seen later, 
these Nth Civilizations pose severe problems to the attacker. 
The average intelligence lag may be estimated from the estimated average density of 
advanced civilizations or their colonies within the galaxy. Assuming, for simplicity, 
the galaxy to be a disk with r = 50 000 ly and h = 1000 ly, even highly optimistic 
estimates – one million evenly distributed civilizations – suggest that the average 
distance between civilizations is ≈ 200 ly. Then the minimum intelligence lag seems 
to be on the order of ≥ 400 years (200 years for signal, another 200 years for near-c 
travel). With only marginally less optimistic assumptions (100 000 civilizations or 
colonies), the average spacing would be ≈ 430 ly and the minimum intelligence lag 
would be almost 900 years. Other authors have reached conclusions suggesting an 
average spacing between “few hundred” and 1700 light years [34]. If the detection 
were supposed to happen because of artificial electromagnetic emissions or other 
signs of technological civilization (e.g. changes in atmospheric composition), this 
would suggest that human-type civilizations have time to develop at least primitive 
retaliatory capabilities by the time any adversary can mount an effective attack (see 
also [9]). Earlier detection is, of course, possible (e.g. from searches for life-bearing 
planets), but then the question why humanity has not already been eradicated becomes 
difficult to answer.  
3.2. The problem of pace of development 
Prior literature has repeatedly argued that any extraterrestrial intelligence would be 
significantly more powerful than human civilization [35]. This is because humans and 
human technology have been relatively recent phenomena in the history of Earth and 
the universe, and because technological development seems to happen relatively 
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quickly compared to evolutionary timescales [10]. Given the age of universe and of 
our galaxy, it would also seem very highly unlikely that two intelligent species would 
develop technological civilizations exactly at the same time. Consequently, it is 
argued, if humans encounter any ETIs at all, they are likely to be very highly 
advanced. 
However, this argument cuts both ways. Any given civilization encountering signs of 
any other civilization for the first time will be fundamentally uncertain as to what is 
the level of their development. The only thing they will know for sure is the same 
thing we know now: it is highly unlikely that they are exactly matched.  
Although it is usually assumed that the level of technological achievement can be 
deduced from various signatures of the civilization (electromagnetic radiation, signs 
of megascale engineering projects, etc.; see e.g. [34]) it is by no means certain that 
highly advanced technologies have to leave highly visible footprints [36]. We also 
know from human history that many technologies remain in widespread use long after 
they have been made obsolete in their primary tasks, if only for entertainment or 
educational purposes. Additionally, it is far from certain that technological 
development proceeds at a same pace across different cultures [37]. In short, 
determining whether observed signatures really represent the genuine capabilities may 
be extremely challenging, particularly if the observations have to be made across 
interstellar distances. 
Suppose, for example, that an invader from the 16th century approaches a modern 
coastline resort. Upon seeing the sails of various pleasure craft, he might deduce that 
our level of technological advancement is not markedly higher than his, and that we 
pose no threat to his war galleon. Similarly, any ETI who is perhaps listening may 
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have problems knowing for certain whether signals emanating from the Earth are the 
genuine legacy of technological development, or a hyper-advanced civilization’s 
analogue to pleasure boating or modern-day renaissance fair.  
What’s more, if an advanced civilization has reasons to believe that other, potentially 
hostile civilizations exist, it may find “bear-baiting” a very attractive strategy. Like a 
hunter using live bait to lure out a bear, advanced civilizations might clandestinely 
follow upcoming civilizations or even create decoys that mimic the signatures of less 
advanced civilizations in the hopes of drawing a response. The rationale for using 
such baits is simple: even advanced civilizations may have reasons to be wary of 
hostile neighbors. Therefore, drawing out hostile civilizations and pre-emptively 
attacking them could be a prudent strategy. 
3.3. The problem of survivors 
The primary concern for any potential aggressor would be whether or not the hostile 
acts will be met with a reprisal. Unfortunately, the distances, timescales and cultural 
differences involved would suggest that making meaningful agreements to end an 
interstellar conflict and monitoring their compliance in the long term are going to be 
nearly impossible (see also Assumption 6 above). Therefore, the only sure way to 
ensure victory would seem to be the complete extermination of the other species.   
By default, any overt attack against a civilization proves to that civilization that 
somewhere out there is a threat capable of severe aggression over interstellar 
distances. The more severe the initial attack, the more likely it is that the Victim 
Civilization will deem that its long-term survival will require retaliation. 
If the VC survives the attack in any form, it is very difficult for the AC to ensure that 
it cannot or will not retaliate at some time in the future. Left to their own devices, 
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even a handful of survivors could repopulate entire planets relatively quickly: for 
example, an average growth rate of 1% - mediocre by historical standards – could 
repopulate the Earth to seven billion people from only a five thousand survivors in 
little more than 700 years. If the motive for initial attack had been to ensure long-term 
survival of the Attacking Civilization by wiping out the competition in the stellar 
neighborhood, a gain of mere 700 years would constitute a massive failure. Even 
“knocking a civilization back to Stone Age” might theoretically mean only some tens 
of thousands of years before the said civilization could pose dangers to the attacker. 
On galactic timescales, even such a respite is temporary at best.  
It is, of course, uncertain whether such survivors would ever be capable of launching 
a successful retaliatory strike. It is also uncertain whether they would want to do so, if 
not for any other reason then because any attempts would draw renewed attention to 
them. However, as long as there are any survivors, the attacker cannot entirely 
discount the possibility. The question, then, is whether the attack leaves any survivors 
capable of holding a grudge. Fortunately from our viewpoint, ensuring the complete 
destruction of an advanced species may be challenging. It is likely that just 100-200 
years will suffice to give humanity, for example, the first permanent foothold in 
space. Unless all space habitats and off-world colonies can be destroyed in the attack, 
it is quite plausible that the survivors will give high priority to hitting back at their 
attacker. Even without space habitats, complete elimination of the dominant species 
of a planet would seem to be a relatively uncertain undertaking. 
An obvious counter would therefore be that the AC would seek to “occupy” the target 
system(s) for a long time, perhaps with automated sentinels, in order to mop up the 
survivors as they are spotted and/or send advance warning of a possible retaliation. 
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However, this requirement adds significantly to the cost, complexity and uncertainties 
of the attack. 
3.4. The problem of witnesses 
Furthermore, even if the Attacking Civilization manages to completely eliminate the 
Victim Civilization, there is always a possibility that other civilizations – the Nth 
Civilizations or NCs - take notice. Logically, any civilization initiating an unprovoked 
attack against another would be very dangerous to other civilizations as well; 
therefore, the AC needs to be sure that other, perhaps so far undetected civilizations 
do not reply with preemptive attacks. It should be noted that these other civilizations 
include not just other aliens, but also possible space-faring relatives of the VC’s (or 
even AC’s) civilization – e.g. colonies or original home worlds. In fact, given the 
probable rarity of advanced species in the galaxy, if NCs exist, they are more likely 
than not going to be off-shoots of the same species as the VC or the AC. Such 
offshoots would seem to be likely to be in contact with each other, and therefore able 
to warn others of an attack, even if the attack succeeds. Therefore, the AC needs to be 
fairly certain that VC is not in contact with other civilizations that have the capability 
to pre-empt. Admittedly, the risk of pre-emption from NC may not be as large as the 
risk of retaliation from the VC: as the lightspeed lag applies to the warning messages 
from VC to NC as well, the AC will at the minimum have more time to prepare for 
possible retaliation. On the other hand, the capabilities of the NC are more likely to 
remain unknown to the AC, and the AC has to take this into account as well. 
In the end, members of same species might be the greatest danger to a civilization that 
displays overtly aggressive tendencies. After all, an aggressive relative also poses a 
threat to them, both directly and indirectly. The direct threat stems from the fact that 
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members of the same species are also the closest competitors in terms of habitat 
requirements etc., and a civilization willing to utterly exterminate aliens may not balk 
at using force against its own species. The indirect threat may materialize if the 
aggressive member of the species provokes an interstellar conflict, as the retaliation is 
unlikely to be very selective.  
3.5. The problem of learning from potentially lethal 
experiments 
It could be argued that all of the above are inferences based on a sample of one or 
zero, and that a hyper-advanced civilization might be much better at estimating the 
strengths and weaknesses of any potential Victim Civilization. But one must consider 
what this implies: accurate assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of an alien 
civilization requires experience with alien civilizations. Although one of the 
traditional assumptions of SETI has been that any ETIs humanity may encounter are 
likely to have encountered other ETIs before (for an example, see e.g. [12]), a 
civilization with experience in fighting other civilizations has to be one that has 
encountered other civilizations in the past, fought conflicts against them, and 
survived. While it is far from impossible to imagine contacts leading into conflicts, 
the extreme uncertainties and expenses of interstellar conflict makes it difficult to 
believe that conflicts between civilizations would be common. It is even more 
difficult to believe that such conflicts happen so frequently that civilizations would 
have survived long enough and accumulated enough experience to determine the 
capabilities of newly contacted civilizations with near-perfect certainty. In fact, the 
more advanced civilizations there are out there, the more likely it is that any would-be 
AC would have a problem with Nth Civilizations or even coalitions of civilizations. 
Although the immense distances mean that alliances are unlikely to be able to help 
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their individual members in time to fight off a surprise attack, it would still be in the 
interests of “peaceful” civilizations to gang up against any civilization displaying 
aggressive tendencies, and as e.g. simulation studies of international relations suggest, 
aggressive civilizations may be at a long-run disadvantage against peaceful but 
vigilant cooperatives — even when the retaliation is not immediate [6].  
Thus, even very advanced civilizations are in all likelihood quite unaccustomed to 
interstellar conflict and unlikely to have a history of preventively eliminating other 
civilizations. Assuming that they would decide to  attack another civilizations simply 
because they could be threats in the future would seem to be highly unrealistic.  
 
4. Modeling the decision-making of interstellar 
attack 
The considerations stated above must necessarily affect the probability that any 
civilization decides to attack another civilization. To provide a moderately analytical 
starting point for the discussion, we can simply calculate the rough probability that the 
Attacking Civilization will escape retaliation from the Victim Civilization and pre-
emption from possible Nth Civilization(s).  
Let the probability Punpunished be the joint probability that the intelligence is adequate 
and timely enough so that 1) the VC’s (and its allies’) essential centers of gravity are 
identified correctly (Pidentified), 2) the attack hits the targets with sufficient force (Phit), 
3) the Victim Civilization’s (and/or its allies’) ability to retaliate has been 
permanently destroyed (Pdestroyed), and 4) there are no Nth Civilizations capable and 
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willing to preempt the Attacking Civilization (P¬NC). The probability that the AC will 
be attacked in return will therefore be the complement,  
€ 
Ppunished =1− (Pidentified × Phit × Pdestroyed × P¬NC )      (1) 
Even if the AC is 95% certain of each individual variable, the probability of counter-
attack is uncomfortably high 0.185; if the certainties are “only” 90%, the Ppunished will 
be 0.34.  I will leave it to the reader to judge whether, given the arguments above, 
confidence levels of 90% or 95% would be attainable in reality.  
Of course, what exact probability of retaliation is required to deter an attack remains a 
matter of debate. Although the limitations of extrapolating from human experience 
must be acknowledged, we may be able to draw some insights from the debate about 
nuclear deterrence. As mentioned above, a recent work assumed that the capability to 
hit ten cities, with one nuclear weapon each, in retaliation would be a credible 
deterrent for the U.S. and Russia both [30]. The assumption did not require the largest 
10 cities to be hit, but if we assume that the retaliation would hit and completely 
destroy the largest ten cities in the U.S. (two highly unrealistic assumptions, but ones 
that increase the margin of error), the retaliation wouldn’t need to threaten more than 
24.5 million people in order to be credible [38]. As this represents approximately 
7.9% of the total population [38], an admittedly rough and unsubtle approximation of 
the expected value of credible deterrent for advanced civilizations might be ≈ 0.1 x 
total loss. Even lower values, such as approximately one million deaths and the 
destruction of sizable part of infrastructure, have been suggested [39]. We might 
conclude that credible deterrent may be achieved by being able to threaten 0.01…0.1 
x total loss. As a real-life example, Chinese nuclear strategy is based on the 
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assumption that deterrence is achieved by the capability to threaten only a few largest 
population and industrial centers in retaliation [40].  
If just one interstellar probe slipping through the defenses could endanger the entire 
planet-bound part of the AC’s civilization, it would seem that probabilities of counter-
attack rising towards 0.2 would at the very least make would-be Attacking 
Civilizations cautious. As seen above, such probabilities arise even when the AC is 
extremely confident of its abilities. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper, I have argued that any interstellar attack is a hazardous gamble for the 
attacker. It seems that if interstellar travel and warfare are at all possible, then any 
civilizations that have a reason to fear another civilization (i.e. are not so far advanced 
that another civilization simply cannot harm them) also have a reason to fear eventual 
retaliation if they attempt to strike first. In order to lower the probability of counter-
attack to levels that are seen to be non-credible deterrents among humans, the 
Attacking Civilization would need to be extremely certain of being able to destroy the 
Victim Civilization (and its allies) and avoid preemptive attacks from Nth 
Civilizations.  
In particular, the time lag between detection and the arrival of the attacking force 
seems to pose extremely grave challenges for the attacker. Even under very optimistic 
assumptions for the density of civilizations in our galaxy, the victim civilization 
would seem to have a distinct chance of spreading out from its home planet and 
developing at least rudimentary survival and retaliatory capability. If the average 
distance between civilizations is short, on the other hand, the greatest threat to the 
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attacking civilization may actually come from Nth Civilizations: If the average 
distance between civilizations is short, on the other hand, the greatest threat to the 
attacking civilization may actually come from Nth Civilizations: if the average 
distance between civilizations is so short that the Victim Civilizations are unable to 
develop effective defenses and retaliatory capabilities, the implication is that 
civilizations are common and therefore it is likely that a large number of civilizations 
will be in position to witness the aggression. Some of these may very well be far more 
advanced than the AC or be able to ally against the AC (or even be allies of the VC), 
and for reasons of self-protection, they may not wish to be neighbors with perpetrators 
of interstellar genocide, even if they cannot or will not attack the AC immediately. 
Although the NC will also risk retaliation if it launches a preemptive attack, it can be 
argued that risking retaliation when the adversary has demonstrated its willingness to 
strike first and revealed its capabilities, in contrast to an unprovoked preventive attack 
against unknown adversary, entails qualitatively different conceptions of risk. What 
probability of retaliation is required to deter an interstellar adversary is, of course, 
open to debate. It is, in fact, my clear intention to encourage the further development 
of the ideas expressed in this paper and the use of explicit methodologies to study 
quantitatively the risks of possible first contact. A follow-up to this paper will develop 
the simplified model towards a more complete model of interstellar conflict, including 
its analysis through computer simulation. Necessary areas of improvement include 
more detailed simulation of the dynamics of interstellar attack; in particular, taking 
into account spatio-temporal distributions of civilizations and their effect on the 
dynamics would be welcome.  
The study also suffers from obvious limitations, the chief of which is that we cannot 
know much anything about the reasoning processes of possible ETIs. As plausible as 
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it sounds to argue that any advanced civilizations must be somewhat rational in the 
sense we would understand it, the specifics of that rationality will certainly differ. 
Regarding the subject of this paper, it is almost equally plausible that the ETIs would 
consider the elimination of “inferior” species their sacred duty, to be undertaken 
despite the risks. Likewise, it is possible that extremely advanced “true” star faring 
civilizations will have their reasons to destroy less advanced civilizations even if they 
cannot pose a threat to them. It is also possible that a civilization will develop 
technologies that make them practically invulnerable to any retaliation from other 
civilizations in the vicinity. 
Unfortunately, we cannot draw from better sources than our own history when 
arguing whether or not a civilization would initiate a preventive attack against other 
civilization. Based on that history, it would seem that any possibly paranoid ETIs that 
may be listening for humanity’s signals are in a position that is roughly analogous to 
the position of the U.S. in the period between the end of the World War Two and the 
first Soviet nuclear bomb. Hostile ETIs could probably hit us severely and have a 
good chance of destroying us for good, but they must also assume that every year 
brings us closer to the capability to retaliate. If the human example is anything like the 
average, the possibility of receiving just one hit from a high-velocity interstellar probe 
on exchange should make the would-be attacker think twice before committing acts of 
aggression.  
Of course, whether our capabilities would in the end be enough to deter attack is 
something that cannot be conclusively proved, except in the negative. However, if the 
current pace of technological development continues, the ETIs need to attack during 
this century – which would require them to have ready forces within approximately 
100 light years, if detection is assumed to be based on leaked electromagnetic 
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radiation – or they will likely have to confront a civilization that already has a sizable 
presence in space and is building its first interstellar spacecraft. Reliably destroying 
such a civilization may prove to be challenging, perhaps challenging enough to cause 
them to reconsider.  
However, the designers of interstellar spacecraft need to consider that their creations 
may be seen as threatening by other species. It is unfortunately all too easy to imagine 
a scenario where a human flyby probe to a supposedly uninhabited system 
accidentally damages a civilization that had chosen to remain quiet, perhaps due to 
paranoid fear of detection, and the said civilization sees no alternative but to strike 
back in order to stop further “attacks.” In short, the mission planning of any 
interstellar spacecraft must ensure beyond reasonable doubt that the target system 
either does not host intelligent life or that the mission will not even appear to pose a 
danger to them. Of course, detecting intelligent life that does not want to be detected 
will be a difficult challenge. 
The METI effort should view these arguments as reasons for cautious optimism. It 
would seem that if ETIs exist in our close neighborhood, any ETI whose technology 
is not far in advance of current human technology would also be likely to be deterred 
from attacking us. On the other hand, an ETI whose technological abilities make it 
invulnerable to whatever humanity can possibly devise would probably also be able to 
detect us, METI or no METI – but such ETIs would seem to have little reason to wish 
us harm. It can also be argued that hostile ETIs need to consider whether METI 
signals are representative of true technological developments or a lure designed to 
give the impression of weakness; this alone should serve as a deterrent of sorts against 
outright preventive attacks at the least. 
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